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Turning Back the Clock - The California Supreme
Court's Decision in McClung v. Employment
Development Department and the Difficulty of
Determining Legislative Intent in Retroactive
Rulemaking
By Jeffrey R. Groendal*
I. INTRODUCTION
A male worker approaches a female co-worker on her first day of
work. Both the man and woman are non-supervisory employees in
the company. He makes casual conversation with her and, over time,
the two become friends. One day, however, the man makes a pass at
the woman, telling her she looks nice and that he would like to take
her out to dinner over the weekend. The woman, uncomfortable
dating a co-worker, declines. The man persists with more forceful
advances, knowing that California law holds only supervisors liable
for sexually harassing an employee. The next week, he sends the
woman an e-mail with sexually explicit content. While passing in the
halls, he consistently makes inappropriate comments to the woman.
She feels so uncomfortable that she tells her supervisor, but the
supervisor does not immediately act, realizing that the man is
working on a big sale to a lucrative client and the deal is still a week
away from closing. The woman is frustrated at the slow response
and instead sues the man under the Fair Employment and Housing
Act ("FEHA"). But the woman loses. At the time she sues,
California law does not permit employees to sue other co-workers for
* Juris Doctor candidate, May 2007, Pepperdine University School of Law.
Bachelor of Science, Business Administration, 2002, University of Southern
California. Thanks to my wife, Whitney, for her support during the writing of this
article.
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sexual harassment under the FEHA and the man's conduct was not so
severe as to be tortious battery or intentional infliction of emotional
distress. A state agency then amends the law to provide for non-
supervisory employee liability. The woman's case is pending at the
time. Can she take advantage of the amendment? Is the man
suddenly responsible for behavior that was not actionable before the
amendment?
A similar dilemma faced the California Supreme Court in
McClung v. Employment Development Department.' The court in
McClung held that an amendment to the FEHA holding non-
supervisory employees liable for sexual harassment of a co-worker
did not apply retroactively to cases pending at the time of its
passage.' The court found insufficient indicia of legislative intent to
apply the amendment retroactively.
3
Against the backdrop of McClung, this note will explore the
principle of retroactivity, tracing its development at the national level
in the U.S. Supreme Court and at the state level with respect to
California courts. Retroactivity is generally disfavored in the law
due to a reluctance to alter the legal consequences of past actions.
But if legislatures and administrative bodies express their intent
clearly enough, the presumption against retroactivity disappears. If,
on the other hand, legislative intent is ambiguous, courts might
interpret the law in a manner with which the Legislature disagrees.
The Legislature will then pass another law purporting to clarify the
meaning of the original law. The result is a delayed resolution to the
matter which, unfortunately, penalizes both plaintiffs and defendants
in the process.
Part II of this note addresses the history and development of
jurisprudence on retroactivity, focusing on the traditional roles of the
Judicial and Legislative Branches and the major cases of both the
U.S. Supreme Court and California courts on retroactivity.4 Part III
sets out the facts of McClung.5 Part IV analyzes and critiques the
court's opinions in MeClung, with a separate analysis of the history
1. McClung v. Employment Dev. Dep't, 99 P.3d 1015 (Cal. 2004).
2. Id. at 1022.
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 8-141 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 142-154 and accompanying text.
of the amendment at issue. 6 Part V addresses the legal and social
impact of McClung7 and Part VI briefly concludes the note.
II. HISTORY
A. Traditional Roles of the Judicial and Legislative Branches
American jurisprudence has long adhered to the principle that the
Legislature makes the law and the judiciary interprets it. This
concept stands on firm footing. In the epic 1803 U.S. Supreme Court
decision Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall clearly and
simply proscribed a role for the judicial branch, stating that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule." 8 The California Supreme
Court has been similarly forthright in expressing the role it plays in
the legal process: "[I]t is the duty of this court, when a question of
law is properly presented, to state the true meaning of the statute
finally and conclusively .... The ultimate interpretation of a statute
is an exercise of the judicial power"9 Because statutory interpretation
is a purely judicial function, courts acknowledge that a legislature
may enact laws only for the future, not for the past.'0 As a result, a
legislature may not enact an amendment that changes existing law
with the intent to affect past transactions. 1 In addition, legislation
passed to clarify a prior statute "merely supplies an indication of the
legislative intent which may be considered together with other factors
6. See infra notes 155-221 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 222-227 and accompanying text.
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
9. Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Cal. Employment Comm'n, 109 P.2d 935, 939 (Cal.
1941).
10. See, e.g., People v. Cuevas, 168 Cal. Rptr. 519, 524 (Ct. App. 1980).
Here, the court states that "[i]n line with the well-established rule that statutory
interpretation is a judicial function, the courts have consistently held that
'declaratory or defining statutes are to be upheld . . . as an exercise of the
legislative power to enact a law for the future."' Id. (quoting In re Coburn, 131 P.
352, 355 (Cal. 1913)).
11. Cal. Employment Stabilization Comm'n v. Chichester Transp. Co., 172
P.2d 100, 102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946).
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in arriving at the true intent existing at the time the legislation was
enacted."12
B. U.S. Supreme Court on Retroactivity
The presumption against retroactive application of statutes is a
well-settled legal principle.' 3  Universally, courts have long
maintained an aversion toward holding individuals accountable for
the violation of laws that were non-existent at the time of their
misconduct. The U.S. Supreme Court has been notably emphatic in
its espousal of the presumption against retroactivity. Perhaps the
most powerful quote from the Court's cases on retroactivity is the
following:
It is contrary to fundamental notions of justice, and
thus contrary to realistic assessment of probable
legislative intent. The principle that the legal effect of
conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law
that existed when the conduct took place has timeless
and universal human appeal. It was recognized by the
Greeks ... by the Romans . .. by [the] English
common law.., and by the Code Napoleon... It has
long been a solid foundation of American law.'4
Indeed, courts at all levels maintain a general disfavor for
retroactive legislation. But until the Court's decision in Landgrafv.
USI Film Products,'5 there existed no definitive U.S. Supreme Court
framework for addressing retroactivity. Before Landgraf conflicting
precedents in Bradley v. Richmond School Board16 and Bowen v.
12. Stockton Sav. & Loan Bank v. Massanet, 114 P.2d 592, 595 (Cal. 1941).
13. See Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 503 (N.Y. 1811) (noting that "[i]t
is a principle in the English common law, as ancient as the law itself, that a statute,
even of its omnipotent parliament, is not to have a retrospective effect"); see also
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) ("[T]he presumption
against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a
legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.").
14. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990).
15. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
16. Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
Georgetown University Hospital7 provided lower courts with little
guidance. 8
1. Pre-Landgraf Disaccord in Precedents
Bradley was decided by the Court in 1974. In that case, the
original suit was filed by African-American parents and guardians
against the School Board in Richmond, Virginia with the aim of
desegregating public schools.' 9 The suit was based on the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 .20 After winning a protracted suit, the parents
requested attorney's fees and expenses, which the district court
awarded.2' At the time of the award, however, there was an absence
of express statutory authority for the district court's action.22 In spite
of this, the court justified the award through equitable principles. 23
More specifically, the court felt that the defendants' conduct in
delaying resolution to the matter caused the plaintiffs unreasonable
time and expense to protect their constitutional rights.24 After
defendants filed an appeal, but before a final decision by the court of
appeals, Congress passed § 718 of the Education Amendments of
1972 ("§ 718,,).25 This legislation expressly provided federal courts
with authority to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party in a
school desegregation case.26 Yet even with authority from § 718, the
court of appeals reversed.27 Essentially, the court of appeals refused
to apply § 718 to services rendered before Congress passed it "on the
ground that 'legislation is not to be given retrospective effect to prior
events unless Congress has clearly indicated an intention to have the
17. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
18. See Michael S. Rafford, Note, The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: Retroactive Application of the RICO Amendment, 23 J. LEGIS. 283,
288 (1997).
19. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 698.
20. Id. at 699.
21. Id. at 705-06.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 706-07.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 696.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 716.
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statute applied in that manner."' 28 Since Congress did not provide
for retroactive application, § 718 could not apply to a case pending
on appeal at the time of its enactment.29
The Supreme Court undertook review to determine whether § 718
should apply to a situation where the appropriateness of a fee award
was pending on appeal when Congress passed § 718. In the end, the
Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and awarded the fees to
the parents. 30 Paramount to the Court's holding was its conclusion in
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham:31 "[A]n appellate
court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision." 32 The Bradley court further emphasized that the Thorpe
holding applied to § 718; in other words, a law passed while a case is
pending still controls even if the law does not convey its intent to
apply to pending cases.33 But this holding was qualified by the Court
in Thorpe.34 A reviewing court cannot apply current law to pending
cases if the result would be manifestly unjust.35 In Bradley, however,
the Court found no such injustice. 36 The school district, in remitting
attorney's fees, did not face an additional burden because similar
awards were granted before the passage of § 718. 31 In addition,
28. Id. at 715 n.20 (quoting Thompson v. Sch. Bd. of Newport News, 472
F.2d 177, 178 (4th Cir. 1972)).
29. Id. at 709. Further, the court emphasized that the district court's decision
to award fees was based on public policy reasons and "if such awards are to be
made to promote the public policy expressed in legislative action, they should be
authorized by Congress and not by the courts." Id.
30. Id. at 724.
31. Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969).
32. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 714 (citing Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 281). Note also the
Court's reference to United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801). The
Court summarizes the age-old precept from Schooner Peggy which directs that a
court is to apply the law that exists at the time the court arrives at its decision,
"unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or
legislative history to the contrary." Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.
33. Id. at 715.
34. Id. at 716.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 721.
37. Id. at 720-21.
applying § 718 did not alter the district's constitutional obligation to
offer nondiscriminatory education.
38
By green-lighting retroactive application of a statute in the
absence of clear legislative intent, did the Court's decision in Bradley
undermine the presumption against retroactivity? Bradley's holding
is especially peculiar in light of the Court's strong stance against
retroactivity in Bowen, a decision handed down 14 years later. In
Bowen, at issue was the authority of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services ("Secretary") to promulgate retroactive
regulations.39 Under Medicare, the Government reimburses health
care providers for the cost of providing medical services to Medicare
policy-holders. 40 The Medicare Act authorizes the Secretary to make
rules limiting the amount that health care providers can receive in
return.41 In 1981, the Secretary issued a "cost-limit schedule" for
services provided to Medicare patients, one which contained changes
to the previous calculation method.42 This schedule, however, was
invalidated because the Secretary did not provide notice and a forum
for public comment, as mandated by the Administrative Procedure
Act.43 But in 1984, the Secretary (this time after public comment) re-
issued the 1981 cost-limit schedule, "the net result [being that it] was
as if the original rule had never been set aside."'  The Court held
that the Secretary's attempt at retroactive rulemaking was improper
because there was nothing in the Medicare Act expressly authorizing
such a process.45 Furthermore, legislative history indicated that the
38. Id. at 720-21.
39. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 206.
40. Id. at 205.
41. Id. at 206.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 207.
45. Id. at 213. Note that the Secretary maintained authority to implement
retroactive corrective adjustments to the aggregate amounts of reimbursement
produced under the calculation methods. Id. at 211. But, as the majority opinion
indicates, "nothing in [this clause] suggests that it permits changes in the methods
used to compute costs... [we cannot find in the language of [this clause] an
independent grant of authority to promulgate regulations establishing the methods
of determining costs." Id.
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House and Senate frowned upon retroactive cost-limit rules.4 6
Ultimately, the Bowen decision illustrates the Court's traditional
disfavor for retroactive application: "[C]ongressional enactments and
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect
unless their language requires this result., 47
2. Landgraf Resolving Retroactivity
In Bradley, the Court approved retroactive application without
legislative intent whereas in Bowen, the Court found the lack of
intent fatal to the rule's retroactivity. 48 The Court set out to clear the
air on retroactivity in Landgraf by distinguishing Bradley and giving
lower courts a structure in which to operate.
In Landgraf, a female employee was allegedly sexually harassed
by a male co-worker.4 9 The woman quit her job because of this
incident.5" The district court held that she was in fact sexually
harassed, but that the harassment was not so serious as to warrant her
46. Id. at 214.
47. Id. at 208. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Bowen is valuable
because of its focus on the responsibility of administrative agencies to avoid
retroactive rulemaking. Justice Scalia interpreted the Administrative Procedure
Act's (APA) definition of "rule." Id. at 216 (Scalia, J., concurring). There can be
no confusion, according to Justice Scalia, "that a rule is a statement that has legal
consequences only for the future." Id. at 217 (Scalia, J., concurring). This
principle has its roots in the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act (1947), which states that "'rule' includes agency statements not only
of general applicability but also those of particular applicability applying either to a
class or to a single person." Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act 13-14 (1947). "In either case, [the statements] must be of future
effect, implementing or prescribing future law." Bowen, 488 U.S. at 218 (Scalia,
J., concurring). Importantly, Justice Scalia also noted the differences between
retroactive legislation and retroactive rulemaking. Id. at 223-24 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). The latter is governed by the APA, which only permits prospective
rulemaking unless Congress authorizes an agency to give a rule retroactive effect.
Id. at 224 (Scalia, J., concurring). In fact, an agency, if it believes that retroactive
application is necessary, must only persuade Congress of that fact to receive
authorization. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted that perhaps even
existing congressional legislation implicitly authorizes retroactive rulemaking. Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring).
48. See supra notes 16-47 and accompanying text.
49. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 248.
50. Id.
decision to resign her position; therefore, her employment was not
terminated under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (relating to
sexual harassment's creation of a hostile work environment) and she
was denied equitable relief.51 Since Title VII did not authorize a
damages remedy in addition to one in equity, the court dismissed the
woman's complaint.52 While she appealed, Congress enacted § 102
of the 1991 Civil Rights Act ("1991 Act"), which contained
provisions creating a right to recover compensatory and punitive
damages for discrimination in violation of Title VII.5 3 The Court
granted certiorari to determine whether § 102 should be applied
retroactively to cases pending when the 1991 Act was passed.54
Holding that § 102 did not apply to a case pending on appeal, the
Court resolved the issue by focusing on general anti-retroactivity
principles, the legislative history of the 1991 Act and its actual text,
and the Bowen and Bradley precedents.55
In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens reiterated the Court's
basic antipathy toward retroactivity, a sentiment also coloring the
Court's opinions in Bradley and Bowen.56 Justice Stevens noted that
"[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals
should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform
their conduct accordingly."5 7 As a result, Justice Stevens continued,
"the 'principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be
assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has
timeless and universal appeal.' ' 58 Justice Stevens noted early signs
of the Founders' support for the anti-retroactivity principle in various
51. Id. at 248-49.
52. Id. at 249.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 249-50.
55. Id. at 265-286
56. Id. at 264.
57. Id. at 265.
58. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827,
855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Justice Stevens offered additional (albeit
philosophical) justification for the Court's stance against retroactivity: "In a free,
dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by
a rule of law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their
actions." Id. at 265-66.
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provisions of the Constitution.59 Such provisions include the Ex Post
Facto Clause, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, the
prohibition on "Bills of Attainder," and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.6 ° With respect to the Ex Post Facto
clause, Article I restrains Congress and the States from retroactively
applying penal legislation. 61  The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment precludes the Legislature from passing laws to deprive
private persons of their preexisting and vested property rights without
just compensation.62 In its prohibitions on Bills of Attainder, the
Constitution bans lawmakers from "singling out disfavored persons
and meting out summary punishment for past conduct."63 Lastly, the
Due Process Clause provides that an individual's interest in fair
notice of what the law requires of him might be "compromised" by
retroactive legislation.6
4
59. Id.
60. Id. at 266.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. Retroactive application of statutes, however, is not completely taboo.
Absent a violation of one of the above constitutional precepts, "retroactivity
provisions often serve entirely benign and legitimate purposes," such as the
following: "[T]o respond to emergencies, to correct mistakes, to prevent
circumvention of a new statute in the interval immediately preceding its passage, or
simply to give comprehensive effect to a new law Congress considers salutary."
Id. at 267-68. Furthermore, there is a line of cases referred by Justice Stevens
which may be deemed "procedural cases." Id. at 275. These particular cases
represent the proposition that changes in procedural rules may be appropriately
applied in suits brought before the enactment of the rule without raising
retroactivity concerns. Id. The Court's rationale, originating in Ex Parte Collett,
337 U.S. 55 (1949), is that there are weak reliance interests in procedural matters.
Rules of procedure tend to regulate only secondary, and not primary conduct. Id.
Therefore, "the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct
giving rise to the suit does not make application of the rule at trial retroactive." Id.
The Court has also granted retroactive application in the event of an intervening
law (meaning one passed after the conduct spawning the lawsuit, but before a court
ruling on the matter) that "authorizes or affects" the appropriateness of prospective
relief. For instance, in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, 257 U.S. 184, 202 (1921), the Court allowed retroactive application of §
20 of the Clayton Act because the particular section governed the "propriety" of
injunctive relief against labor picketing.
As illustrated, the task of determining if retroactivity is accepted
or not by the Court is uncomplicated; the weight of the case law
indicates that the Court's aversion to retroactivity is incontrovertible.
A more difficult inquiry, however, is identifying when a statute
operates retroactively. The general rule is that the Court will not
apply a statute retroactively unless Congress (or the administrative
body enacting the rule) evinced clear intent to do so.65 But since its
early days, the Court has set a high bar for proving legislative intent.
For instance, Justice Stevens in Landgraf referred to an 1806 case,
United States v. Heth,66 in which the Court refused to apply a federal
statute reducing commissions of customs collectors to those
collections commenced prior to the passage of the statute because of
a lack of "'clear, strong, and imperative' language requiring
retroactive application." 67 According to Justice Stevens, requiring an
"unambiguous directive" or "express command . . . assures that
Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness
of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price
to pay for the countervailing benefits."68
In Landgraf, Justice Stevens suggested a framework for
analyzing legislative intent.69  The probable context for such an
examination is when a case involves a federal statute enacted after
the events at issue took place.7" In this instance, according to
Landgraf, a court's initial task is to determine whether Congress
65. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265.
66. United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. 399 (1806).
67. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270 (quoting Heth, 7 U.S. at 413). The principle
exhorted by the Court in Heth is again repeated in United States v. Sec. Indus.
Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), a more modem case. There, the Court conveyed the
importance of unmistakable intent thusly: "[A] retrospective operation will not be
given to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights.. .unless such be 'the
unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the
[L]egislature."' Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 79 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913)).
68. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 263, 272-74, 280. Justice Stevens' prefatory
comment to this point is that a presumption against retroactivity "accords with
widely held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate" and as such,
"coincide[s] with legislative and public expectations." Id. at 272.
69. Id. at 270.
70. Id. at 280.
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expressly prescribed the temporal reach of the statute.7" The Court
completes this task by examining the ambiguity, or lack thereof, in
the language of the statute.72 If, for instance, Congress or the
administrative body passing the law affirmatively provides for the
law's application to matters currently pending in court, then the
statute will be given retroactive effect (even if the conduct at issue
occurred before the passage of the law).73 But if the statute is
ambiguous in this regard, the second step for the Court is to evaluate
whether or not the newly passed statute would have retroactive
effect, "i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he
acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new
duties with respect to transactions already completed., 74 If the Court
determines that the statute has such an effect, "our traditional
presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear
congressional intent favoring such a result., 75
Applying the above to the particulars of Landgraf and the 1991
Act, Justice Stevens found no clear intent to apply the Act's
provisions retroactively. 76 With regard to legislative history, two bits
71. Id.
72. Id. at 273. At this point, Justice Stevens referred to the Court's decision in
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801). Id. In that case, a treaty
signed while the case was pending on appeal clearly provided for the "restoration
of captured property 'not yet definitively condemned."' Id. at 273 (quoting
Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch at 107). Since this language was unambiguous, Justice
Stevens notes that the Court in Schooner Peggy reversed a decree entered before
the signing of the treaty that condemned a French vessel that was seized in
American waters. Id. In response to the language of the decree, the Court applied
"the law in effect" at the time of its decision. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch at 109.
Cf I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320-21 n.45 (2001) (holding that "a statute that
is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed . . . to be
unambiguously prospective") (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 264).
73. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added). On the issue of legislative intent in Landgraf, the
Court held that the new Title. VII provision to the 1991 Civil Rights Act does not
apply retroactively because of a lack of clear intent. Justice Stevens remarked that
had Congress intended to apply the provision, it should have inserted the following
language: "[T]he new provisions 'shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after the date of enactment of this Act."' Id. at 260 (quoting S. 2104,
101st Cong. § 15(a)(4) (1990)).
76. Id. at 262.
26-2
of evidence support the finding of a lack of intent." First, the House
version originally contained an express grant of retroactive
application, but the Senate later eliminated that provision.78 Next,
the President vetoed the 1990 Civil Rights Act partly on the basis of
"unfair retroactivity rules." 79  The Court pointed out that the
omission of retroactivity language in the 1991 version was not
accidental; rather, the omission was one of the compromises which
paved the way for the passage of the 1991 Act.80
But legislative history was not enough, the Court stated, and an
examination of the text of the 1991 Act was necessary. 8' In
particular, the Court evaluated Landgraf s position that, because the
1991 Act expressly provided for prospective application in two
provisions, the Court should presuppose that the opposite was
intended for the remainder of the provisions. 82 Yet, the Court did not
take the bait: "[g]iven the high stakes of the retroactivity question,
the broad coverage of the statute, and the prominent and specific
retroactivity provisions in the 1990 bill, it would be surprising for
Congress to have chosen to resolve that question through negative
inferences drawn from two provisions of quite limited effect., 83
Even if Congress had intended to provide for retroactive application
via such inferences, Justice Stevens remarked that this would be a
notably indirect route to convey a basic message.84 In fact, Justice
Stevens maintained that Congress could have easily inserted the
following language: "the new provisions 'shall apply to all
proceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment of
this Act.' ' 85 Due to the lack of such language and the evidence
gleaned from examining legislative history, the Court failed to
identify express intent to apply the 1991 Act to cases pending on
appeal.86
77. Id.
78. Id. at 262.
79. Id. at 255-56.
80. Id. at 256.
81. Id. at 257.
82. Id. at 259.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 262.
85. Id. at 260 (quoting S. 2104 101st Cong. §15(a)(4) (1990)).
86. Id. at 293.
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After arriving at a conclusion on legislative intent, the Court
proceeded to rectify its holdings in Bradley and Bowen. Regarding
Bradley, which "suggests a categorical presumption in favor of
application of all new rules of law," the Court sought to clarify that
Bradley did not subvert the principles of anti-retroactivity.87 Instead,
the Court will apply Bradley provided that: "1) no vested right of a
party has been substantially affected; 2) the statute granted or
removed jurisdiction from a particular judicial body; and 3)
procedural rules are involved. ' 88 According to the Landgrafopinion,
Bradley represented a narrow exception to anti-retroactivity, one that
is particular to attorney's fees. 89  The Court noted that a
determination of attorney's fees is "collateral to the main cause of
action," and separate from the main cause of action at trial.9° Also,
existing legislation at the time already provided for attorney's fees,
so retroactively awarding them did not impose an unforeseeable
burden on the school board.91 Equitable considerations played an
additional role in the appropriateness of retroactive awarding of fees,
as Justice Stevens wrote that "it would be difficult to imagine a
stronger equitable case for an attorney's fee award than a lawsuit in
which the plaintiff parents would otherwise have to bear the costs of
desegregating their children's public schools." 9
2
At last, in Landgraf, the Court's willingness to clarify and guide
produced solid ground for lower courts to stand on in matters of
retroactivity. The jurisprudence in California has proved fertile for
testing the strength of the Court's retroactivity principles.
D. California Courts on Retroactivity
1. In general
Indeed, California courts are bound by the standards set forth in
the previously discussed decisions of the United States Supreme
87. Id. at 277.
88. Rafford, supra note 18, at 292.
89. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 277.
90. Id. (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec. 455 U.S.
445,451-52 (1978)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
Court. It is instructive, however, to similarly trace the development
of the anti-retroactivity principle in California. Furthermore, the
decisions in this state contain a variety of fact patterns that are
germane to an analysis of McClung.
The seminal case on retroactivity is Aetna Casualty Insurance
Company v. Industrial Accident Committee.93  In Aetna, the
California Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is an established canon of
interpretation that statutes are not to be given a retrospective
operation unless it is clearly made to appear that such was the
legislative intent., 94  A statute has retrospective effect when it
substantially alters the legal consequences of events occurring in the
past.95  In this case, an employee was injured and filed for a
compensation award with the Industrial Accident Commission
("Commission"). 96 At the time the employee was injured, the Labor
Code provided that, where an injury causes both temporary and
permanent disability, the employee is not entitled to both a temporary
and permanent award; rather, she can only receive the greater of the
tWo. 97 The statute was subsequently amended to allow an injured
employee to receive portions of both awards, if certain requirements
were met.98 Therefore, when the Commission issued its award, it did
93. Aetna Cas. Ins. Co. v. Indust. Accident Comm., 182 P.2d 159 (Cal. 1947).
94. Id. at 161. See also DuBois v. Wokers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 853 P.2d
978, 980-81 (Cal. 1993) (discussing the standard for statutory interpretation in
California). In DuBois, the California Supreme Court succinctly stated the method
of interpreting statutes in California. Id. Essentially, DuBois related that "[a]
fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court should ascertain the intent
of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." Id. at 980. First,
according to the court, a court should examine the language of the statute itself. Id.
Then, when the language is unambiguous and there is no confusion as to legislative
intent, the inquiry ends. Id. If the words are unclear, they must be interpreted in
their context, "keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where
they appear." Id. at 981. Additionally, "the various parts of a statutory enactment
must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of
the statutory framework as a whole." Id. In turn, the courts use rules of
construction or legislative history and practice to assist in determining the intent of
the Legislature. Id.
95. Aetna, 182 P.2d at 162.
96. Id. at 160.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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so pursuant to the amended statute.99 The court examined the
language of the amended statute and held that the Legislature did not
intend to apply it in cases where the injury occurred prior to the
effective date of the enactment. 100 In particular, the court noted that
the Legislature "would have expressly provided for retrospective
operation of the amendment if it had so intended."' '
Over time, California courts have steadfastly adhered to the
principles from Aetna. At issue in Evangelatos v. Superior Court10 2
was the applicability of the Fair Responsibility Act (commonly
known as Proposition 5 1), which was a provision of the California
Civil Code. The authors of the Evangelatos opinion point to
California Civil Code section 3, which (although only applicable to
provisions in the Civil Code) embodies the basic rule on retroactivity
- "[n]o part of [this Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared."' 1 3 According to Evangelatos, this section of the Civil
Code "reflects the common understanding that legislative provisions
are presumed to operate prospectively, and that they should be so
interpreted 'unless express language or clear and unavoidable
implication negatives the presumption. ' ' ' 104  In this case, voters
passed Proposition 51, which limited an individual tortfeasor's
responsibility for non-economic damages to the percentage of his
fault. 1 5  Shortly after the proposition took effect, the plaintiffs
pending personal injury action was assigned for trial and the parties
requested the court to decide if the proposition would apply
retroactively. 10 6 Ultimately, the California Supreme Court held that
the Act did not apply retroactively. 107 The court was unable to find
any language in the proposition that clearly conveyed legislative
99. Id.
100. Id. at 163.
101. Id.
102. Evangelatos v. Super. Ct., 753 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1988).
103. Id. at 597.
104. Id. (quoting Glavinich v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 209 Cal.
Rptr. 266, 271 (Ct. App. 1984)). The court in Evangelatos held that the Act
(Proposition 51) did not contain sufficient indicia of legislative intent to apply the
provision retroactively.
105. Id. at 586.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 587.
intent to overcome the presumption against retroactivity.
108
Furthermore, the court emphasized the importance of the Civil
Code's anti-retroactivity principle to Proposition 51; since the
proposition once voted on became part of the Civil Code, it could not
apply retroactively in the absence of express legislative intent. 1°9
Significantly, the Evangelatos standard has carried the day for later
opinions from the California Supreme Court. An example is the
2002 decision of Myers v. Philip Morris Companies. 1° In that case,
the court noted that although there is "no talismanic word or phrase
.. required to establish retroactivity," in order for extrinsic evidence
to overcome the presumption, there must be an "unequivocal and
inflexible statement of retroactivity that Evangelatos requires."'
2. Clarifying or declaring existing law
Both Aetna and Evangelatos are examples of a clear absence of
intent to apply legislation retroactively. Often, however, the situation
is hazier. For instance, an amended statute may aim to "clarify" the
earlier statute or "declare" existing law. In spite of such specific
language, "courts will not infer that the Legislature intended only to
clarify the law unless the nature of the amendment clearly
108. Id. at 598.
109. Id. Defendants in this case sought to counter plaintiff's argument here by
citing to broad language in the statute, viz. that the statute is to apply "[i]n any
action .... " Id. at 591 n.4. The court rejected the contention that this language
evinces strong intent to apply the provision to pending claims involving torts
committed before the passing of the proposition. Id. at 598. Defendants also
argued in the alternative - even if there was no express legislative intent, then there
was implied intent based on legislative history or the context surrounding the
enactment of the proposition. Id. at 598-99. With respect to legislative intent, the
court remarked that there was a dearth of evidence to indicate that retroactivity was
discussed in legislative debates or during any aspect of the enactment process. Id.
at 599. Concerning the claim for surrounding context, the court acknowledged that
it has previously allowed retroactive application for this reason, but only in a
criminal context with regard to ameliorative penal statutes. Id. at 599 n.15.
Indeed, the court noted, it has never been inclined (nor have other jurisdictions
been so inclined) to apply the special rule concerning implied retroactivity of
special mitigating penalty provisions to general tort reform measures such as
Proposition 51. Id.
110. Myers v. Philip Morris Cos., 50 P.3d 751 (Cal. 2002).
111. Id. at760.
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demonstrates that this is the case or the Legislature itself states in a
particular amendment that its intent was to be declaratory of the
existing law."' 12 Therefore, California courts still evaluate whether
the amendment changes the law or merely clarifies or is declaratory
of existing law. 113  To resolve this issue, state courts examine
whether the language of the statute is materially altered by the
amendment. 14 If the original statute is in fact altered, this indicates
legislative intent to change the statute's meaning. 1 5 But on the other
hand, mere passage of an amendment does not automatically signal a
change in meaning. A court's assessment of surrounding
circumstances "can indicate that the Legislature made material
changes in statutory language in an effort only to clarify a statute's
true meaning."' 16 As a result, the act of clarifying a statute does not
violate anti-retroactivity principles even if the clarification is applied
to transactions predating the amendment's enactment; the initial
statute, at its core, is not changed if its true meaning remains
intact. 17
112. Verreos v. City & County of San Francisco, 133 Cal. Rptr. 649, 657 (Ct.
App. 1976).
113. See People v. Cruz, 919 P.2d 731, 742 (Cal. 1996) (holding that
"[b]ecause the determination of the meaning of statutes is a judicial function, a
court, faced with the question of determining the scope of the earlier version, still
must ascertain from all the pertinent circumstances ...whether the subsequent
amendment . . . constitutes a modification or instead a clarification of the
preexisting provision").
114. Verreos, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
115. Id. (asserting that "[i]t is a settled principle of statutory construction that
a material change in the language of a legislative enactment is ordinarily viewed as
showing an intent on the part of the Legislature to change the meaning of the
statute"). Verreos also notes that in the event that the amendment follows a court
decision interpreting the law in its original form, this is also considered an espousal
of a legislature's intent to change the meaning of the statute. Id.
116. W. Sec. Bank v. Super. Ct., 933 P.2d 507, 514 (Cal. 1997) (emphasis
added).
117. Id. Significantly, the court noted that while a legislative declaration on
the meaning of an existing statute is not binding on a court in interpreting the
statute's meaning, such a pronouncement is entitled to great consideration. Id.
(stating that "'a subsequent expression of the Legislature as to the intent of the
prior statute, although not binding on the court, may properly be used in
determining the effect of a prior act') (quoting Cal. Employment Stabilization
Comm'n v. Payne, 187 P.2d 702, 704 (Cal. 1948) (en banc)).
Courts are particularly inclined to accept a legislature's attempt to
clarify a statute's meaning when the legislature timely responds to a
controversy over a statute's interpretation. 18 An example of this
proclivity appears in the California Supreme Court's opinion in
Western Security Bank v. Superior Court. In Western, a partnership
obtained a loan secured by real property and supported by letters of
credit." 9  After the partnership defaulted, the bank presented the
letters to the issuer in an attempt to cover the unpaid balance.120 The
issuer, however, brought a declaratory relief action seeking to
establish that it was not obligated to honor the bank's tender of the
letters of credit. 12 1 Eventually, the court of appeal ruled that the
issuer may decline to honor the letters. 122 Immediately thereafter, the
Legislature passed "urgency legislation" in response, intending to
immediately clarify that the issuer in this instance does not have a
basis for refusing to honor such a draw on letters of credit.,2 3 The
California Supreme Court remanded the matter to the court of appeal
for reconsideration as a result of the urgency legislation, after which
the appeals court held that the legislation marked a change in existing
law and therefore could not apply retroactively. 124  The California
Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of appeal.'25 The court
was heavily swayed by the timeliness of the passage of the
legislation: "[i]f the Legislature acts promptly to correct a perceived
problem with a judicial construction of a statute, the courts generally
give the Legislature's action its intended effect."' 126 The court
recognized that the urgency legislation explicitly conveyed the
Legislature's intent to apply the provision to existing loan
transactions at issue in this case.127 Note that even after evaluating
legislative intent, the court still proceeded to analyze whether the
118. Id. at 514.
119. Id. at 510-11.
120. Id. at 512.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 513.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 516.
126. Id. at 515.
127. Id.
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Legislature's action effected a change in law.128 But through an
assessment of actual statutory language, the court found that the
legislative action did not change the law; rather, it "simply clarified
and confirmed the state of the law prior to the Court of Appeal's first
opinion."'129 Indeed, this case presents a formula for avoiding judicial
scrutiny for retroactivity: clear legislative intent to clarify a prior
enactment coupled with language which avoids changing the
operation of that enactment.130
In addition to timely response to a controversy, another factor
deserving of mention is when a court invites a legislature to clarify its
legislative intent. Typically, when courts invite the Legislature to
clarify certain unsettled issues of law, they do so explicitly.' 31 A
prime example from the California Supreme Court is its decision in
Renee v. Superior Court.132 In Renee, the court was faced with the
task of interpreting a section of the Welfare and Institutions Code.' 33
The matter concerned the circumstances under which reunification
services are to be provided in child dependency proceedings. 134 The
court, in concluding that the statute was ambiguous and interpreting
it using legislative history, invited the Legislature to clarify: "[i]f we
have failed to discern correctly the Legislature's intent in enacting
the statute, that body may clarify the statute accordingly."'1 35
Significantly, however, there is a difference between requests to
clarify and requests to take corrective action. The former would
likely permit an amendment which clarifies existing law to apply
retroactively, whereas the latter would involve a change in law and,
128. Id. at 516.
129. Id. at 520.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., People v. Simon, 886 P.2d 1271, 1282 n.13 (Cal. 1995) ("We
encourage the Legislature to clarify which of the criminal violations of the
Corporate Securities Law of 1968 that are punishable under either subdivision (a)
or (b) of Section 25540 are strict liability offenses and what mental states are
elements of those which require scienter."); International Longshoremen's and
Warehouseman's Union v. L.A. Export Terminal, Inc., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 456, 467
n.6 (Ct. App. 1999) ("If our interpretation of various aspects of the Brown Act is
not what the Legislature intended, the statutory scheme could use clarification.").
132. Renee J. v. Super. Ct., 28 P.3d 876 (Cal. 2001).
133. Id. at 878.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 884.
as such, could not apply retroactively. For instance, in Cory v.
Shierloh, the California Supreme Court addressed the matter of the
civil liability of social hosts for providing alcohol to intoxicated
guests. 136 Under California law, social hosts were immunized from
such liability, and the court mused that through narrowing liability,
the Legislature might be creating problems rather than solving
them.'37 While the court refused to change this provision (due to
concerns for separation of powers), it invited the Legislature to act:
"[t]he forum for the correction of ill-considered legislation is a
responsive legislature."' 38  Subsequent to Cory, the Legislature
amended the law to enlarge liability to any provider of alcohol to
obviously intoxicated minors. In Baker v. Sudo, the Court of Appeals
addressed the timing and substance of the amendment, noting that
"[t]he Cory court clearly invited the Legislature to take corrective
action back then . . . ,,139 The Baker decision, then, is a fine
illustration of the factors in deciding whether legislative response to a
court decision is a clarification or a change in law: 1) whether the
invitation was to correct or clarify; 2) whether the Legislature acted
timely; and 3) whether there was legislative intent to apply the
amendment retroactively. 40  The court in Baker held that the
amendment was a change in law because the court in Cory invited
only corrective action, the amendment was passed five years after the
decision in Cory, and there was no urgency clause or any other
language indicating intent to apply retroactively.' 41
III. FACTS
In Carrisales v. Department of Corrections,142 the California
Supreme Court interpreted § 12940 of the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act relating to a non-supervisory
employee's liability for harassing a co-worker. The court in
136. Cory v. Shierloh, 629 P.2d 8 (Cal. 1981).
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id. (citation omitted).
139. Baker v. Sudo, 240 Cal. Rptr. 38, 44 (Ct. App. 1987).
140. Id. at 40-44.
141. Id.
142. Carrisales v. Dep't of Corrs., 988 P.2d 1083 (Cal. 1999).
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Carrisales concluded that the FEHA does not hold non-supervisors
personally liable for harassment. 4 3  Subsequent to Carrisales the
Legislature amended the FEHA, adding subdivision (j)(3) which
imposed liability on co-workers.' 44
Plaintiff Lesli Ann McClung was an auditor for the California
Employment Development Department (EDD). 145  She initiated a
complaint against the EDD and Manuel Lopez, the lead auditor,
alleging a hostile work environment and failure to remedy a hostile
work environment under the FEHA.146 Ms. McClung filed her claim
before the passage of the above amendment. 147 Initially, the superior
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, EDD
and Mr. Lopez, and Ms. McClung appealed. 148 The court of appeal,
while affirming summary judgment for EDD, reversed as to Mr.
Lopez, holding that he was responsible for the harassment of Ms.
McClung as her co-worker. 149 This ruling was contrary to the court's
interpretation of the FEHA in Carrisales.15 ° Yet the court of appeal
justified its position by referencing the amendment. 5' The court
noted that the subdivision preceding the amendment, (j)(2), stated
that its provisions "are declaratory of existing law."' 5 2 As a result,
143. Id. at 1088.
144. See McClung v. Employment Dev. Dep't, 99 P.3d 1015, 1017 (Cal.
2004). Subdivision 0)(2) reads: "The provisions of this subdivision are declaratory
of existing law, except for the new duties imposed on employers with regard to
harassment." Cal. Gov't Code § 12940 (j)(2) (West 2004). Subdivision (j)(3)
reads:
An employee of an entity subject to this subdivision is personally
liable for any harassment prohibited by this section that is
perpetrated by the employee, regardless of whether the employer
or covered entity knows or should have known of the conduct
and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.
§ 12940 0)(3).
145. McClung, 99 P.3d at 1018.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
the court reasoned, this statement "supports the conclusion that [the
amendment] merely clarifies the meaning of the prior statute;" more
specifically, the statement indicated legislative intent to apply the
subsequent personal liability amendment to all pending cases,
including Ms. McClung's against Mr. Lopez.' 53
The California Supreme Court granted review to decide whether
the amendment, subdivision (j)(3), was operative in this case.' 54
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
A. Majority Opinion
The Court's majority opinion contains discussion on each of the
following categories: a review of Carrisales and the importance of
the role of the judiciary in interpreting statutory language; an analysis
on whether the amendment appearing in subdivision (j)(3) changed
the law; and an analysis on whether the amendment applies
retroactively. These categories are very interrelated.
Initially, the Court reemphasized, in a matter-of-fact fashion, the
holding of Carrisales: the FEHA, as interpreted, did not impose
personal liability on coworkers (or non-supervisory employees) for
harassment of other employees.'55  The power of statutory
interpretation is only reserved for the judiciary and the Court in
McClung was very protective of this power, noting that "the
Legislature has no authority to interpret a statute. That is a judicial
task." ' 56 The Court related that while the Legislature may, by a
present enactment, define prior statutory language for the purposes of
retroactive application, it lacks any authority "simply to say what it
did mean."' 57  So according to the Court, after it conclusively
interpreted Carrisales, the Legislature had no authority to decide that
the subsequent amendment was declaratory of the law that existed
before Carrisales.'5  The Court conceded that a legislature can
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1020 (citation omitted).
157. Id. (citation omitted).
158. Id.
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overrule an interpretive decision - but it cannot pass a new law
intending to establish what the law always was, in a manner
inconsistent with a previous interpretation of the court. 159 This, as
the Court holds, is beyond the power of the Legislature.1 60 Once a
court finally and conclusively interpreted the statute in Carrisales, "a
legislative clarification in the amended statute may not be used to
overrule this exercise of the judicial function of statutory
construction and interpretation. The amended statute defines the law
for the future, but it cannot define the law for the past., 161
More importantly, the Court pointed out that when the
Legislature enacts such a new law, the result is a change in the law
regardless of the Legislature's attempt to claim that it only intended a
clarification.' 62 If a court found that the amendment was limited to
clarifying existing law, there would be no issue of retroactive
application because the original meaning of the statute remained
intact. In such a scenario, "personal liability would have existed at
the time of the actions, and the amendment would not have changed
anything."'163  Conversely, if the amendment effected a change in
law, actions occurring before it would now have different legal
consequences.' 64 On this issue, the Court's stance was unmistakable:
159. Id.
160. Id. The Court here used People v. Harvey, 602 P.2d 396 (Cal. 1979) as
an illustration. In that case, as McClung explains, the California Supreme court
interpreted a section of the Penal Code as not permitting a type of "consecutive
sentence enhancement." Id. In response, the Legislature promptly amended the
statute to allow such enhancement and additionally, declared that its intent was to
clarify the legislative intent since before the passage of the amendment. Id. As the
opinion noted, "[t]he judicial response was swift and emphatic." Id. According to
the majority opinion in McClung, the court in Harvey held that even though the
Legislature can amend to overrule a judicial decision, "doing so changes the law."
Id. Consequently, the court in Harvey refused retroactive application of the
amendment. Id.
161. Id. (quoting Cuevas, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 519).
162. Id. The Court significantly noted the following: "A declaration that a
statutory amendment merely clarified the law 'cannot be given an obviously absurd
effect, and the court cannot accept the Legislative statement that an unmistakable
change in the statute is nothing more than a clarification and restatement of its
original terms."' Id. (quoting Payne, 187 P.2d at 704).
163. McClung, 99 P.3d at 1019.
164. Id. (holding that "[i]n this case, applying the amendment to impose
liability that did not otherwise exist would be a retroactive application because it
"[i]t seems clear, and no one disputes, that [the amendment] imposes
on [non-supervisory co-workers] the personal liability that Carrisales
said the FEHA had not imposed."' 165
But the Court's decision that the amendment changed, rather than
clarified, the law did not end the inquiry for the Court. The Court's
finding of a change in law eliminated the possibility of retroactive
application of the amendment, but only if there was similarly a lack
of intent to apply the amendment retroactively. On this issue, the
Court found "nothing here to overcome the strong [constitutional]
presumption against retroactivity."'' 66 In particular, the Court stated
that subdivision (j)(2), which conveys that the provisions of the
subdivision are declaratory of existing law, "long predate[d] the
Legislature's overruling of Carrisales."'167 Since, in the amendment,
the Legislature did not include such language in subdivision (j)(3),
the Court held this omission to severely weaken the potential claim
that the Legislature intended 0)(3) to apply retroactively.' 68 Indeed,
in the court's observation, there was a total absence of legislative
intent to apply the amendment retroactively: "[s]pecifically, we see
no clear and unavoidable intent to have the statute retroactively
impose liability for actions not subject to liability" prior to the
passage of the amendment.
69
would 'attach new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment"')
(citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270).
165. Id. at 1018. The Court admitted that the Carrisales decision came down
after Ms. McClung initiated her action against the EDD and Mr. Lopez. Id. at
1020. But, as the Court stated, judicial interpretation of a statute provides the
meaning of the statute both before and after a decision on the case that spawns the
court's interpretation. Id. at 1020.
166. Id. at 1021. The Court cited to the court of appeal's reliance on Western
Security and Payne for the proposition that a legislature's clarification indicates
that the amendment apply to all causes of action existing at the time of the passage
of the amendment. Id. at 1022. But the Court dismissed this reliance because, it
noted, neither case "holds that an erroneous statement that an amendment merely
declares existing law is sufficient to overcome the strong presumption against
retroactively applying a statute that responds to a judicial interpretation." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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B. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
The concurring and dissenting opinion, whose author and sole
supporter is Justice Moreno, conceded that the Legislature could not
clarify the meaning of the statute in a way that was inconsistent with
the court's interpretation in Carrisales.7 ° But this is the only point
on which the two sides agree. Justice Moreno then concluded that by
attempting to clarify its original intent, the Legislature evinced clear
intent to apply the amendment retroactively.171 Thus, he asserted,
California courts have resolved to give retroactive effect to
legislative efforts to clarify existing law "unless there is some
constitutional objection thereto."'1 72
Primarily, Justice Moreno sought to preserve and give effect to
what he perceived as clear legislative intent to apply the amended
provisions retroactively. Justice Moreno cited to the California
Constitution, which states that "[a] statute that is amended is 're-
enacted as amended."",17 3  Therefore, the amendment of a statute
ordinarily has the legal effect of re-enacting the statute in its
amended form and this includes the unamended portions.'74 Justice
Moreno emphasized that the mere fact that the statement in
subdivision 0)(2) preceded the amendment did not diminish the plain
meaning of the statute that all provisions of (j) were declaratory of
existing law. 17 5 Justice Moreno characterized this attempt by the
Legislature as a clear intent to apply the amendment retroactively. 76
Recalling Western Security, Justice Moreno asserted that while the
court might not accept a legislature's attempt to clarify or declare
law, courts should still accept such a statement as indicative of
legislative intent. 177 In turn, if a statute attempts to clarify or declare
existing law, "[i]t is obvious that such a provision is indicative of a
170. Id. at 1023 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
171. Id. at 1024 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
172. Id. (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Cal. Employment
Stabilization Comm'n v. Payne, 187 P.2d 702, 704 (Cal. 1948) (en banc)).
173. Id. (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Cal. Const. art. IV, §
9).
174. Id. (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
175. Id. (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
176. Id. at 1023 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
177. Id. (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
legislative intent that the amendment apply to all existing causes of
action from the date of its enactment."1 78
Arriving at the conclusion that the Legislature intended to apply
the statute retroactively with its attempt to declare existing law,
Justice Moreno insisted that such intent be honored unless there is a
constitutional objection.1 79  According to Justice Moreno, the
constitutional impediments here are "modest." 180 He reasoned that
the majority only stated that the retroactive application of the
amendment would "raise constitutional implications;" it did not
allude to any particular constitutional violation from applying 0)(3)
retroactively.' 81 In fact, Justice Moreno noted that neither the U.S.
Supreme Court nor the California Supreme Court has expressly held
that "retroactively creating liability for past conduct might violate the
Constitution."' 182 Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Landgraf Justice Moreno emphasized that, in the absence of
constitutional violations, retroactive legislation often serves
wholesome purposes. In particular, Justice Moreno referred to a
passage in Landgraf which stated that merely "the potential
unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for
a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope."'1 83 Instead, where
there is sufficient legislative intent and no constitutional violation,
retroactivity provisions are acceptable forms of legislation.184
Also, Justice Moreno noted that although non-supervisors were
not liable for harassment until the passage of the amendment, they
were previously liable in tort for their individual actions.1
85
178. Id. (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting W. Sec. Bank v.
Super. Ct., 933 P.2d 507, 515 (Cal. 1997) (citation omitted)).
179. Id. at 1024 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
180. Id. at 1025 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
181. Id. (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
182. Id. at 1022 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
183. Id. at 1024 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Landgraf,
511 U.S. at 267-68).
184. Id. (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Moreno recalled
from Landgraf that retroactive legislation is helpful in the following situations:
responding to a need for urgent legislation, assuring that a wrongdoer does not
avoid the strictures of a new law in the interval preceding its passage, and giving
effect to a new law which Congress believes is "salutary." Id. (quoting Landgraf
511 U.S. at 268).
185. Id. (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Therefore, Justice Moreno reasoned, defendants such as Mr. Lopez
were indeed liable even before the amendment - just not under the
FEHA. 8 6  Justice Moreno essentially noted that the legal
consequence of these workers' actions was, in general, not altered by
the passage of the amendment.
C. Senate Judiciary Committee's Bill Analysis
The majority and concurrence/dissent disagree on one main issue:
whether the statement that the provisions of subdivision (j) were
declaratory of existing law provided sufficient legislative intent to
apply the amendment to actions pre-dating its passage. Curiously,
neither the majority nor the concurrence/dissent thoroughly analyzed
the legislative history of the amendment to glean further information
on legislative intent. In Landgraf, the U.S. Supreme Court's most
recent pronouncement on retroactivity, the Court examined both the
text of the statute and its legislative history to elucidate the context in
which the bill was passed.'" 7 While legislative history was not
dispositive in Landgraf (the Court was mainly swayed by the lack of
express language in the 1991 Act to apply its provisions
retroactively), it was a significant factor.188
To that end, the most helpful document is the Senate Judiciary
Committee's Analysis of Assembly Bill 1856 ("Analysis").' 89
Assembly Bill 1856 ("AB 1856") was the name of the bill before it
was passed and integrated into the FEHA. The Analysis was the last
of its kind produced by the Judiciary Committee before the bill's
passage in September 2000. While also not dispositive in this case,
the Analysis contains information that would have been helpful to
both opinions in McClung.
First, the Analysis offered a brief background on the Carrisales
case, the court decision which paved the way for the Legislature's
attempt to amend the FEHA. While Carrisales unequivocally
interpreted section 12940 as imposing liability for sexual harassment
186. Id. (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
187. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 255-56, 262.
188. Id. at 262 (noting that legislative history serves to "reinforce" the Court's
conclusion).
189. Cal. Sen. Corn. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1856 (1999-
2000 Reg. Sess.) (Aug. 8, 2000).
only on supervisory employees, the court invited the Legislature to
consider whether non-supervisory employees should assume liability
as well. 190 In response to this, the Analysis conveyed, the author of
the bill sought to take "the next logical step by clarifying that errant
employees face the same threat of legal sanctions. By making certain
that harassers are not let off the hook merely because of a job title,
this bill will help stamp out harassment in the workplace."'' The
author further intimated that AB 1856 did not purport to change
existing law as to what constituted sexual harassment under the
FEHA.'92  The FEHA required that, before bringing a claim, the
harassment must have been "so severe that it produces an abusive
working environment."'1 93 The bill was designed only to hold the
person doing the harassing responsible for his or her actions,
regardless of status in the company.' 94
The Analysis proceeded to address instances where the court's
interpretation in Carrisales conflicted with decisions by other
authorities. For instance, the Fair Employment and Housing
Commission ("FEHC") is the agency responsible for enforcing the
FEHA. 195 On two separate occasions, the Analysis noted, the FEHC
interpreted the same language that the Carrisales court interpreted -
but arrived at different conclusions.' 96 In both cases, the FEHC
elected to hold non-supervisory co-workers liable for harassment
under section 12940.197 Similarly, according to the Analysis, a
treatise on employment law entitled California Employment Law
held that section 12940 (even before its amendment) might hold
employees liable for sexual harassment.1 98 The treatise emphasized
the importance of the language of section 12940: in addition to
190. See Carrisales v. Dep't of Corrs., 988 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Cal. 1999) ("If the
Legislature believes it necessary or desirable to impose individual liability on
coworkers, it can do so. But we believe that had it already intended to do so, it
would have used clearer language than that found in [s]ection 12940(h)(1).").
191. Cal. Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1856 at 2.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 3.
198. Id.
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employers, "any other person" was prohibited from harassing
conduct and as defined by California Government Code section
12925(d), a person means "one or more individuals."'1 99
Consequently, it appeared that individuals including non-supervisory
employees could be liable for sexual harassment.200
Just as the Court in Landgraf assessed the contents of past
proposed bills, the Analysis does the same with respect to sexual
harassment liability for employees and employers. 20 1 In 1995, Senate
Bill 953 ("SB 953") would have rendered employees personally
liable for harassment of another employee. 20 2 This bill, however,
was quashed in the Senate.20 3 At the time, however, a Senate
Judiciary Committee Analysis on that particular bill maintained that
the provision assigning personal liability to employees was
declaratory of then-existing law. 20 4 The Analysis of SB 953 took the
lead from Matthews v. Superior Court, a Court of Appeal case which
reviewed then-subdivision (h)(1) of section 12940.205 In Matthews,
the court noted that, under the FEHA, it was unlawful employment
practice "for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the
doing of any of the acts forbidden under [section 12940] or attempt to
do so."206  Furthermore, California Government Code section
12965(b) authorized a civil lawsuit under the FEHA against "the
person, employer, labor organization or employment agency"
responsible for the harassment.20 7 In sum, Matthews seemed to
support SB 953's position that individuals, not just employers, were
similarly responsible for sexual harassment under the FEHA: "[o]ur
holding that the responsibility for such acts must be borne both by the
offender as well as the employer who tolerates the offense is
consistent with the Legislature's intent to provide 'effective remedies
which will eliminate such discriminatory practices.' 20 8
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Matthews v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 353-54 (Ct. App. 1995).
206. Id. at 354 (quoting Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(g) (West 2004)).
207. Id. (quoting Cal. Gov't Code § 12965(b) (West 2004)).
208. Id. at 355-56.
A closer reading of Matthews, however, reveals that existing law
in 1995 was not as SB 953 proclaimed. Matthews primarily
supported the proposition that only employers and certain individuals
with supervisory responsibilities were responsible under the FEHA;
average employees were not included in this category.20 9
Specifically, Matthews identifies the following individuals as subject
to liability under the FEHA:
[W]ith authority to hire and fire or to control the
conditions of employment, who either participate in
the unlawful conduct, tacitly approve of the improper
action, fail to take action upon learning of the
discriminatory conduct, or participate in the decision-
making process which is the basis of the
discriminatory condition .... 210
Further, according to Matthews, the FEHC (the body charged
with enforcing the FEHA) has held personally liable, as agents of the
employer, "individuals having supervisory status who either
themselves did the wrongful act or participated in the decision-
making process which formed the basis of the discriminatory
condition." 211 Armed with a full reading of Matthews, existing law at
the time of SB 953 indeed subjected individuals to liability; but only
those individuals holding supervisory status. The majority opinion in
McClung could have pointed to the fact that even before Carrisales,
existing law cut in favor of holding only supervisory employees
liable. Furthermore, as in Landgraf, the majority opinion could have
cited to the fact that a bill purporting to hold mere employees liable
was rejected (SB 953).212 This action, while not completely
dispositive of legislative intent, could have served as a compelling
factor in the court's holding that the amendment to the FEHA was a
209. Id. at 354.
210. Id.
211. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting DFEH v. Right Way Homes, Inc., No. 90-
16, FEHC Precedential Decs. 1990-1991, CEB 5.1, p. 15).
212. See Landgraf 511 U.S. at 256. The 1990 version of the Civil Rights Act
contained language regarding the retroactivity of the Act's provisions. Id. The
1990 Act was vetoed by the President in part because of its retroactive
characteristics. Id. The final version of the Act was passed without such
retroactive language. Id. The Court held this to be a factor in determining
legislative intent. Id.
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change in law rather than a clarification or declaration of existing
law.
The Analysis is instructive on another topic addressed by Justice
Moreno's opinion: the availability of other tort remedies prior to the
FEHA amendment. Justice Moreno based his conclusion that the
amendment did not change the law in part on "the circumstance that
harassment by non-supervisory coworkers was tortious prior to the
statutory amendment imposing liability for such conduct under the
FEHA ... "213 But the Analysis conveys that traditional battery or
intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") claims were
insufficient prior to the amendment.214 For example, a plaintiff may
sue for battery, but only if there is sufficiently offensive physical
contact to support such a suit.215 Further, with respect to IIED, the
plaintiff must show extreme and outrageous conduct which results in
severe emotional distress.21 6 Under the FEHA, however, the bar is
much lower: the plaintiff need only prove that the harassing behavior
sufficiently altered the workplace.217 The Analysis correctly pointed
out that the tort theories were inadequate to protect employees
harassed by their co-workers. 218 Therefore, it is logical to conclude
that the amendment changed rather than clarified existing law.
Subdivision (j)(3) made employees liable under the FEHA who
might not have been liable in tort. Justice Moreno missed out on
making this distinction when discussing the fact that individual
employees were liable even before the FEHA.
The Analysis, then, supports the inference that the amendment
changed, rather than clarified, existing law despite the viewpoint of
the author of the bill. The author maintained that AB 1856 did not
change existing law as to what constituted sexual harassment and that
the bill only "clarifiied] that errant employees face the same threat of
213. McClung, 99 P.3d at 1015 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
214. Cal. Sen. Corn. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1856 at p. 4.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. (noting that "[t]he inadequacies of these theories to protect those who
suffer harassment in the workplace highlight the need for a statute such as FEHA to
create liability as a means of deterring and redressing unlawful workplace
conduct").
legal sanctions.,, 219 But as noted above, when a statute purports to
"clarify" or "declare" existing law, as did the FEHA amendment,
courts cannot take the Legislature or administrative body at its
word.220 Courts will proceed to analyze whether the amendment
actually changed existing law.221 The FEHA, prior to AB 1856, held
only employers and other individuals with supervisory
responsibilities responsible for sexual harassment. Amending the
statute caused employees in non-supervisory positions to be
responsible under the FEHA in addition to sustaining tort liability for
serious harassment. Also, a previous bill aiming to accomplish the
same task as the FEHA amendment died on the Senate floor in 1995.
Thus, examining the legislative history and text of the amendment,
the amendment assigned new consequences to actions which did not
exist under the FEHA before the amendment. Justice Moreno's
concurring and dissenting opinion seemingly fell short in overcoming
these hurdles. Similarly, the majority opinion could have used the
information from the Analysis to buoy its conclusions.
VI. IMPACT
A. Legal Impact
The main impact of the court's decision in McClung falls on the
haziness of the guidelines under which legislatures and
administrative agencies must operate. The court's standard for
proving legislative intent with respect to retroactive application of
statutes is a high bar. This places a burden on drafters to state their
intent to apply the provisions of the statute retroactively. Especially
in California, legislators can ill-afford to merely state that an
amendment clarifies or declares existing law. Importantly, another
sentence is required, similar to the following: it is the intent of the
Legislature to convey that this amendment does not change existing
219. Id. at2.
220. See People v. Cruz, 919 P.2d 731, 742 (Cal. 1996). There, faced with a
statute which set out to clarify or declare existing law, the California Supreme
Court asserted that a court must still determine whether the amendment actually
constituted a change in law. Id.
221. Id.
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law, and the provisions of this amendment are to apply to actions pre-
dating the passage of this amendment.
Even if intent is clearly expressed, however, the statute is subject
to judicial scrutiny. If a court perceives that a law propagates
constitutional violations, then it will not be given retroactive effect
regardless of the clarity of intent. This, however, seems fair given
the need to protect against provisions that are constitutionally
objectionable. Legislatures and administrative bodies would be well-
advised to consider whether their enactment impairs constitutional
rights and perhaps add a statement in the act or amendment
addressing potential constitutional concerns.
Another issue worth mentioning is the ongoing tension between
the legislative and judicial branch. Disputes over retroactive
application seem to spawn a tennis match of sorts between the two
entities. But what is an administrative body to do if it cannot get on
the same page as the courts? If a legislature desires to overrule a
court's interpretation of a law, then this is viewed as a change in the
law and the court cannot apply the change retroactively. In the
meantime, plaintiffs and defendants bear the brunt of the inability of
the courts and legislature to define precisely what a statute means.
For instance, what if the Legislature intends for a statute to cover
certain behavior, but the court does not interpret it as such? The
court's interpretation is given significant effect in that if its decision
"finally and conclusively" interprets the statute, a legislature cannot
thereafter clarify that the meaning of the statute was different than
what the court concluded.222 All the while, a plaintiff seeking a
remedy must hope that the court invites the Legislature to pass
legislation to clarify its meaning, and the Legislature responds in
kind by passing urgency legislation. If the Legislature delays in
doing so, this might factor into a court's subsequent analysis of
legislative intent. Specifically, the court would find that the
Legislature did not consider the matter important enough to act
quickly and the plaintiff would have little hope of convincing a court
otherwise.
A simple solution seems to be that legislatures and administrative
agencies should take heed of the level of legislative intent required to
222. See Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Cal. Employment Comm'n, 109 P.2d 935, 939
(Cal. 1941).
apply a statute retroactively and conform the language of their
amendments and statutes accordingly. Courts will likely persist in
their function of interpreting statutes as they see fit, guided by the
ancient principle of separation of powers.
A recent example in California that may have strong implications,
both legally and socially, on retroactivity principles is the passage of
Senate Bill 899 ("SB 899"). This bill, passed in 2004, relates to
workers compensation and requires that apportionment of a
permanent disability shall be based on causation. It states the
following:
A physician shall make an apportionment
determination by finding what approximate
percentage of the permanent disability was caused by
the direct result of injury arising out of and occurring
in the course of employment and what approximate
percentage of the permanent disability was caused by
other factors both before and subsequent to the [work]
injury, including prior [work] injuries.223
In Kleeman v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, the Court
of Appeals recently reviewed this section of the Labor Code to
determine whether it was to retroactively apply to cases pending on
the date of its enactment.2 24 The court determined that the section
was a substantive change in law because liability of the employer
may be changed or even eliminated where a permanent disability is
caused by a pre-existing condition.225 In examining legislative intent
to apply this substantive change retroactively, the court concluded
that there was sufficient evidence of intent. In section 47 of SB 899,
the Legislature unambiguously stated that the changes brought about
by SB 899 were to apply to pending cases as of the date of its
enactment.226
Legally, Kleemann can be distinguished from McClung on the
language contained in the two enactments. McClung had no such
explicit language indicating intent to apply section 12940(j)(3) to
pending matters. But in Kleemann, this language is evident. Since
223. Cal. Lab. Code § 4663 (West 2004).
224. Kleemann v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 448 (Ct. App.
2005).
225. Id. at 455.
226. Id. at 456.
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the right to workers compensation is granted by statute and not
vested according to common law, there is no interference with a
claimant's constitutional right and thus, the intent of the Legislature
is given its full effect.227
B. Social Impact
Kleemann is an example of a plaintiff affected by a court's
finding of retroactive application. The plaintiff in McClung,
however, is at the opposite end of the spectrum. Ms. McClung was
left without a remedy because the court found that an amendment did
not apply retroactively. Plaintiffs such as Ms. McClung might have
no recourse simply because a legislature did not say the first time
what it really meant. On the other hand, the policy reasons against
retroactivity are likely so weighty as to justify the heavy burden
placed on administrative agencies to draft laws that conform to this
high standard. If a legislature or administrative body is permitted to
freely apply laws retroactively, then actions by an individual before a
statute's passage will subsequently take on different consequences all
with the stroke of a pen. This is patently unfair to those who rely on
the state of a law at the time of their actions.
Returning to Kleemann, plaintiffs in workers' compensation
actions with cases pending during the passage of SB 899 were
seriously affected by its retroactive application. Prior to SB 899,
claimants did not have to worry about apportioning fault; a claimant
filing for an injury sustained on the job expected to be compensated
in full. After SB 899, however, the same plaintiff might be faced
with the reality of receiving less than full compensation if the injury
was pre-existing. The moral of Kleemann is clearly that legislative
intent to apply retroactively will be given full effect by courts, as
long as the rights of parties are not unconstitutionally denied. Since
Kleemann involved statutorily given rights, there were no
constitutional objections to retroactive application.
227. Id. at 456.
VI. CONCLUSION
Retroactive application of statutes is not an issue on the minds of
Americans .. . until they are affected by it. Just ask Ms. McClung
how she feels about being denied a remedy under the FEHA for Mr.
Lopez' gross misconduct. Or ask Mr. Kleemann if he would have
preferred full compensation instead of partial compensation for his
work injury.
With sufficient intent, a legislature or administrative body may
alter the legal consequences of actions occurring in the past. Indeed,
it is necessary to honor legislative intent to the extent it is clear and
unambiguous. Further, courts serve as guardians of the Constitution
to ensure that people's rights are not inappropriately infringed by
retroactive legislation. But what should be done when legislative
intent is at first unclear, a court misinterprets the statute, and the
Legislature then seeks to clarify what it meant all along? The
unfortunate result is that plaintiffs and defendants assume the lion's
share of the burden for this "back and forth" between the courts and
legislature.
Legislatures and administrative bodies must take the lead in
assuring that an enactment is clear on its face. Then, both the
legislative and judicial bodies may effectively pursue their roles
prescribed by the Constitution: the Legislature makes the law and the
courts interpret it. Hopefully, clearer legislative enactments will lead
to appropriate interpretations by the courts and the problems
associated with "turning back the clock" will become a thing of the
past.
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